As part of the research in my Cultural Politics of Climate Change project, I’m exploring the politics of climate change within the City of Ottawa. I’m looking for help in building this research, by crowdsourcing ideas and material to research further.
One bit of this research involves establishing a database of climate change governance initiatives within the City. This draws on similar work done by Harriet Bulkeley and various colleagues, both looking at comparisons of climate change experiments in various cities around the world (see her book An Urban Politics of Climate Change), and specifically in Australian cities (warning, paywall for academic article).
Along with a research assistant, Benoit Metlej, I’ve established a provisional database of initiatives for Ottawa. The criteria for inclusion are pretty broad:
- it must be an initiative which explicitly regards climate change in its goals and aims. It doesn’t need to have climate in its name, or necessarily be “primarily” about climate, but it must articulate its goals in relation to climate change
- it must seek in some sense to govern in relation to climate change. Governance or governing is however here understood very broadly – it is not only about making laws, but anything that seeks to shape directly how society responds to climate change. It can include making new rules, introducing new technologies, financing activities, building new buildings or other physical infrastructure, capacity building for organisations and communities, setting targets and monitoring progress. And it is not only done by “governments” in the traditional sense – all sorts of actors can be involved in governing. The main exclusion is that it needs do something more than simply lobby some other agency to do something.
- We’re not interested only in ones that “work” or seem “important”. The objective at this stage at least is to map as much of the population of initiatives as we can. We may be able to learn much from which seem to work and which seem to do less well.
Here is our current list: Initiatives (click on the link to see the pdf). We are fully aware that it’s provisional (indeed it’ll never be final) and we’ve probably missed some obvious ones.
If you know of any others, I’d love to hear from you. You can put them in as comments below, but ideally email them to me at email@example.com. We don’t need anything other than the name of the initiative: we can research the rest (but we may be back in touch if you are involved in the initiative.)
Thanks for your help! I look forward to hearing from you.
In the context of my current SSHRC grant, I’m advertising two linked PhD scholarships to work on the “cultural politics of climate change”. One scholarship is available to work with Simon Dalby at Wilfrid Laurier on narrative strategies in global climate politics, while the other is to work with me at the University of Ottawa on popular culture, technology, and climate politics.
Project 1. Professor Simon Dalby is offering funding, from September 2015 for a PhD student to work on a thesis on narrative strategies in global climate politics. The student’s research will focus on approaches within popular culture that enable novel ways of imagining responses to climate change. Within this broad framing, the student will identify their particular approach and focus.
The research will be supervised by Simon Dalby. The student will be a member of a team of researchers (faculty and graduate students) at Wilfrid Laurier University, the University of Ottawa, Simon Fraser University, Lund University (Sweden) and Durham University (UK). In particular, I will be supervising a PhD student also working on popular culture and climate change politics, with whom the successful candidate will be encouraged to collaborate.
The stipend will be worth $11,000, and will be awarded for three years for a PhD student. In addition, the student will have access to funding for travel to conferences and carrying out fieldwork. Students in the PhD Global Governance program normally receive four years of funding. In addition to the stipend, the Ph.D. student will be eligible to receive a $25,000 Balsillie Doctoral Fellowship in their first year and to apply for Balsillie Doctoral funding in subsequent years. The final terms of the funding will be outlined in the offer of acceptance. In the event that student receives an external award, the funding package would be revised.
For more details, including regarding the overall project within which the students’ work will be situated, see here. For enquiries, please contact Simon Dalby at firstname.lastname@example.org. For details of the application process to the Balsillie School please contact Dr Andrew Thompson at email@example.com.
Project 2. I am is offering stipend funding, from September 2015, for a PhD/MA student to work on a thesis on popular culture, technology, and climate politics. The student’s research will focus on the inter-relation between popular culture, low carbon technologies, subjectivity, and the politics of the shift to a low-carbon future. Within this broad framing, the student will identify their particular approach and focus.
I will be supervising this research. The student will be a member of a team of researchers (faculty and graduate students) at Wilfrid Laurier University, the University of Ottawa, Simon Fraser University, Lund University (Sweden) and Durham University (UK). In particular, Simon Dalby at Wilfrid Laurier University will be supervising a PhD student also working on popular culture and climate change politics, with whom the successful candidate will be encouraged to collaborate.
The stipend will be worth $17703 per year (increasing in line with University commitments), and will be awarded for three years (PhD student) or one year (MA student). It will cover the Faculty’s portion of the university admission scholarship (see http://www.grad.uottawa.ca/Default.aspx?tabid=1458) plus the equivalent of an additional research assistantship for the summer. In addition, the student will have access to funding for travel to conferences and carrying out fieldwork.
For more details, including regarding the overall project within which the students’ work will be situated, see here. For enquiries, please contact me at firstname.lastname@example.org. The student could be registered in a number of possible programs at the University, including Political Science, Sociology, Feminist and Gender Studies, and Environmental Sustainability. For details of admission and the programs see here. Admission deadlines to these programs are mostly in late January or early February. I’ll be happy to talk about which programs may work best depending on your interests.
The UNFCCC and Beyond: Transnational Climate Change Governance – See more at: http://cips.uottawa.ca/the-unfccc-and-beyond-transnational-climate-change-governance/#sthash.QNCPs4W5.dpuf
The world’s attention (or at least that bit of it thinking about climate change at all) is focused again on the annual UN negotiations that convene for two weeks every December. This year in Lima, increasing attention is being given to a huge array of initiatives that work outside, or alongside, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Academic research has recently started to focus intensively on this phenomenon, now most commonly captured in the term ‘transnational climate change governance’ (TCCG).
In May 2014, I was awarded a grant by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to work on the ‘cultural politics of climate change’. This is a large, 5-year project, involving collaborators from various universities, specifically Caroline Andrew, Harriet Bulkeley, Simon Dalby, Shane Gunster, Matthew Hoffmann, Paul Saurette, and Johannes Stripple.
The project has four sub-projects.
The first looks at explicit attempts at “carbon governmentality”: campaigns or governing initiatives that seek to shape individual subjects. A useful example is the notion of “carbon dieting”.
The second explores the politics of attempting to manage greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at the level of a single city – Ottawa – where many of the key conflicts over transport, housing, and energy arise in daily life.
The third explores the campaigns to undermine climate change science, attempting to go beyond an exploration in terms of corporate interests and conservative thinktanks (the focus of existing literature) to explore the underlying cultural values at stake.
The fourth explores how climate change subjectivities, and the conflicts around them, are constructed and reflected in popular culture – film, novels, cartoons, and so on. These are deliberately designed to be diverse, and thus to explore the breadth of the sites in which the general phenomena arise.
You can find more details of the project here: Cultural politics of climate change description
I am on research leave in the Winter Semester. Can’t say I’m not ready for it.
I decided what I really need is to read. I don’t need time to write, but I am in grave danger of having no real ideas about which to write. Jo came up with the great metaphor (not least given my gardening tendencies) that my soil is exhausted and I need to add some organic matter – leaf mould, sheep manure, etc. to fertilise the brain.
So I asked a bunch of my colleagues, with different sorts of interests, the following question:
Can you give me a couple of suggestions of readings – books or articles – that you’ve found really exciting and interesting, that you’ve read in the last year or two? I don’t care in what area (I need to be eclectic), just the most interesting things you’ve read, full of ideas to get the ‘little grey cells’ going.
And please don’t agonise, whatever comes into your head first!
Here are the responses from those who responded, in no particular order. Some are more obvious than others, but a pretty decent reading list to be going on with. They are academics, so the ‘two’ constraint was clearly a struggle for some :-).
Reviel Netz, Barbed Wire
Grégoire Chamayou, Manhunts: a philosophical history
Franco Bifo Berardi, After the Future
John Blewitt and Ray Cunningham (eds) The Post-growth project
Andrew Dobson, Listening for Democracy
Andrew Barry, Material Politics
Warren Magnusson, Politics of Urbanism
Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything (two votes)
Tanya Murray Li, The Will to Improve
Clive Hamilton Earthmasters
Barbara Kingsolver Flight Behavior
James Lovelock Rough Ride to the Future
Peter Taylor Extraordinary Cities
Saskia Sassen Expulsions
James Meek Private Island
Anna Tsing Friction
Cary Wolfe Before the Law
Timothy Campbell Improper Life
Timothy Mitchell Rule of Experts
Geoff Mann Disassembly Required
Jessica Dempsey Enterprising Nature (not out yet!)
The Polity Resources series books (Timber, Fish, Coltan, Oil, Land, Food, etc.).
Stacy VanDeveer’s Trans Atlantic Institute report “Still Digging”
Gavin Bridge’s 2004 Annual Review of Energy and Environment piece on Mining and the Environment.
Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World became Modern (Norton, 2011). A brilliant read about Renaissance book-hunters rediscovering lost classics from antiquity. (MP: I’ve already read this – it is excellent)
Melissa Lane, Greek and Roman Political Ideas (Pelican, 2014). Great intellectual history that explores key political concepts in the ancient world.
Brendan Simms, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, 1453 to the Present (Penguin, 2014). A very readable book that tells the history of Europe exactly as the sub-title says.
Slavoj Zizek First as Tragedy, then as Farce
The documentary series Untold History of the United States
With U.S.-China climate deal, Canada’s isolation deepens – See more at: http://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/blog/us-china-climate-deal-canadas-isolation-deepens#sthash.4SHCEV39.dpuf
Tuesday’s U.S.-China climate deal has been hailed widely as an “historic deal” that dramatically changes the dynamics of international climate politics as countries search for a new global agreement by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Climate Convention in Paris in 2015.
Clearly it is a welcome development in a number of senses: it involves a very public commitment from the world’s largest emitters that will be hard to renege on; it puts pressure on other countries that have not already made pledges (many already have) to reduce emissions, or to up the ambition of their pledges in some cases; and it can act to create further trust amongst countries that the major emitters are negotiating in good faith building momentum towards Paris.
I’ve been struck by how a number of the framings of the backloading (withdrawing European Union Allowances – EUAs – from the system for a specific period of time) debate re the EU ETS have attempted a ‘depoliticising’ move – have in effect argued that what the failure of the EU ETS (so far, it’s coming back to the EU parliament later on this month) to agree to backloading should be interpreted to mean that decisions about the EU ETS should be taken out of the politicians and put into the hands of ‘competent’ technocrats.
Katherine Lake at the University of Melbourne, for example, argued that we need a “carbon bank“, to make decisions about the allocation of EUAs, instead of the European Parliament. It would operate along similar lines to an independent central bank for the supply of money: given a specific target (like the inflation targets most central banks work to) and then left to manage the availability of carbon allowances to meet that target. The Carbon Markets and Investors Association (CMIA), the lobby group for carbon traders, were more explicit and took to Twitter to argue that the EUETS “should be in the hands of a professional independent Carbon body not MEPs”.
What seems to me to be going on here is a shift in how carbon markets are understood to operate. In this framing, the carbon market becomes an end not a means. It becomes understood as something that is first and foremost a market, and should operate according to the “normal” function of other markets. Prices should be determined by supply and demand, and where prices collapse (as they have since the recession), this implies some sort of disequilibrium in the functioning of the market that needs to be corrected.
But of course carbon markets are artifices in the extreme. Perhaps no markets are “natural” in the sense that Adam Smith understood them (as the reflection of the “natural propensity to barter and truck”) but carbon markets more than perhaps any other arise not out of a “spontaneous” formation amongst buyers and sellers, but as a specific regulatory intervention designed to reduce GHG emissions. The official economic rationale is that if they work properly they do so at the lowest overall cost to society.
But this means that first and foremost, carbon markets are means, not ends. They are there to help achieve GHG reductions, anything else is secondary. They may in fact be useless at doing this, in which case they should be abandoned (as many critics of carbon markets argue powerfully).
But this means that the backloading debate should not be understood as about the “proper functioning of the market”, and thus depoliticised via the establishment of a carbon bank. In effect what occurs in the carbon bank proposal is that the target that such a bank would be asked to achieve is not a specific GHG emissions reduction target but a carbon price target (in which case you might as well simply have a carbon tax). In a cap and trade system, the aim is for a specific reduction in GHG emissions, not a specific carbon price. So to backload, or withdraw allowances from the system, is to increase the ambition of the overall climate policy target.
Now this would be an excellent thing, and as I have argued elsewhere, one of the advantages of a cap and trade system (they have many flaws) is that in a recession it creates pressure for making climate policy more ambitious (whereas with a carbon tax the pressure would go the other way) but it is anything but a simple managerial or technical matter. It goes to the heart of our collective decisions about climate change policy. To think otherwise is to treat carbon markets as ends in themselves, which in effect is to treat the pursuit of the interests of the carbon traders (who want high prices to generate demand for hedging instruments) or some of the regulated firms (electricity generators who are net sellers of EUAs, for example) as the primary goal of the policy. It is highly useful that such actors see benefits of climate policy, as it helps sustain the legitimacy of climate policy. But the basic goals of the policy – the overall level of ambition in emissions reductions, should be kept in the hands of open political debate.